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Abstract— We consider the problem of detecting the insider-
based attacks in the form of jammers in a single-hop wireless
LAN environment, where jammers have the inside knowledge
of frequency hopping patterns and any protocols used in the
wireless network. We propose a novel jammer model in which
the jammers are modeled by the number of channels that they
can jam simultaneously. We further propose the novel concept
of an atomic jammer which is the basic component necessary to
deal with stronger jammers. To deal with atomic jammers, we
propose a class of novel protocols called alibi protocols. The basic
idea of the alibi protocols is to exploit one major limitation of the
atomic jammers: they cannot jam two channels at the same time.
Therefore, honest nodes in the network can occasionally switch to
another channel, called the alibi channel, to transmit proofs for
their honesty witnessed by some other honest nodes. We specify
a necessary condition and desired properties such as detection
time, false alarms and miss detections of this class of protocols.
We prove that with high probability the detection time of these
protocols is O(n ln(n)). We also propose some more practical
alibi-based protocols such as 1-propagation and 1-gossiping and
prove their desired properties. We further extend our work to the
lossy channel model. The simulation results in ns2 confirm our
analysis. The overall results of these protocols show a promising
research direction to deal with insider-based jamming attacks. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to jam-
ming attacks due to the open and shared nature of wireless
medium. In the jamming attack, an attacker injects a high level
of noise into the wireless system which significantly reduces
the signal to noise and interference ratio (SNIR) and reducing
probability of successful message receptions.
The jamming attack is serious in several ways. First, jam-
ming attack is a type of Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS).
Jammed communication channels are useless most of the time.
Second, it is relatively easy to perform a jamming attack.
The attacker only needs a transmitter (i.e. jamming device)
powerful enough to transmit a signal to disrupt the targeted
wireless communication because the wireless medium is open
and shared in nature. For example, an inexpensive device able
to transmit signal on 2.4Ghz is enough to jam a 802.11b
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network [1], [2]. Third, it is hard to detect the jamming attack
(i.e. the existence of the attack) and identify/locate the attacker.
The main reason is due to the ambiguity between unintentional
interference and intentional jamming attacks [3]. Lastly, even
if the jamming attack and the attacker are detected, it is very
challenging to automatically recover from the jamming attacks
[4][5][6]. The network needs an out-of-band means to defense
the attacks (e.g. having a person remove the jamming device
or having the network do a spatial retreat [4]).
There has been plethora body of research work on jam-
ming attacks and defenses. Jamming attacks can be classified
as proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming strategy,
the attacker jams the channel without caring about the on-
going communication. A typical example of this type is the
continuous jamming [7][2]. This strategy is the simplest way
to perform a jamming attack. However, it is not energy-
efficient due to the continuous jamming activity. This also
makes the attacker easy to detect. Reactive jamming strategy
[8][9][10][11][12] [13][14][15][2][16] [17], in contrast, avoids
these drawbacks by intelligently listening and jamming the
channel. In this strategy, the attacker only keeps listening and
jams “important” packets such as control packets [14][15].
Corrupted control packets can drastically reduce the effective
throughput of the communication channel [14][15]. Reactive
jamming attack is more complicated than a proactive jam-
ming attack. It is harder to detect and does not necessarily
use less energy because the transmitter has to listen to the
communication channel. The danger of reactive jamming
lies in the“effectiveness” measured by the ratio between the
effort spent to corrupt packets and the damage caused to the
communication channel.
Due to the danger of various jamming attacks, jamming
defenses have gained much attention from researchers. One of
the most effective jamming mitigation is the spread spectrum
techniques. By hopping the carrier frequency (frequency-
hopping spread spectrum - FHSS) or spreading its signal in
time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS), the network
can force the jammer to expend several-fold more power than
if spread spectrum were not used [18][17]. However, spread
spectrum does not work if the jammer knows the hopping-
pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN)
sequence of DSSS. Once the attacker knows such knowledge,
he can jam the channel very effective. For example, in 802.11
DSSS the PN is a common knowledge and the attacker can
easily obtain it [19]. By just using the COTS 802.11 cards, the
attacker can easily modify the firmware to have an effective
802.11 jammer [2]. That said, the “outsider” attack (i.e. no
knowledge of the HP or PN) can be defended effectively with
spread spectrum technology while “insider” attack is still a
problem.
Indeed, dealing with insider-based attacks, where the
“shared secret” such as shared HP or PN is compromised,
is a challenging problem. This problem exists not only in
the spread spectrum technology but also in other wireless
technologies such as Ultra-wide band (UWB) (pulse-pattern
as the shared secret)[18][20]. Unfortunately, there have been
few research results on this topic. These research results share
the view of considering shared secret as a type of “shared
key” among all nodes. From this point of view, dealing with
compromised shared key is similar to the key management in
the traditional security literature. Specifically, hierarchical key
management and asymmetrical key scheme have been explored
in [5] and [20]. In [5], the authors extend the idea from
the well-known hierarchical key management to eliminate the
compromised shared secret. However, this scheme is designed
only for wireless broadcast network where the base station
can send/receive on different channels at the same time. In
[20], the authors propose a concurrent coding scheme to
form a communication primitive under jamming condition.
This can be used as a way to setup a shared key from the
asymmetric key by using some techniques like Diffie-Hellman
[21]. This scheme, however, is only applicable for point-to-
point communication.
In this work, we consider the problem of detecting the
insider-based jammer in time slotted single-hop wireless net-
works. Specifically, in our attack model, the jammer knows
the shared secret and any protocols used in the system (i.e.
no security-by-obscurity). The jammer intelligently uses the
reactive jamming strategy to hide himself from getting de-
tected. We start from an important observation that a jammer
cannot send on two different channels simultaneously. That
means, within a time slot that is small enough, the jammer
cannot send/jam on two different channels. This observation
leads to the definition of “atomic jammer”. By following this
definition, stronger jammers, such as the ones that can send on
multiple channels simultaneously, can always be broken down
into multiple atomic jammers. Therefore, our exact problem is
detecting one insider-based atomic jammer in the single-hop
wireless networks.
We propose a novel approach to cope with this problem.
Our basic idea to exploit the limitation of the atomic jammer
by introducing an additional channel, called “alibi” channel,
beside the main channel. The alibi channel is used for nodes
to create alibis - proofs for the honesty. Specifically, an alibi
for a node is a proof showing that in the specified time
slot the node was seen, by some witnesses, sending a good
message while the main channel was jammed, observed by
some witnessed. Hence, the node is obviously not the atomic
jammer. We design a class of randomized protocols in which
only good nodes can create alibis while the atomic jammer
will never be able to create the proof even though he knows
the design of the protocol. In our protocols, the atomic jammer
will eventually be identified when each good node has its
alibi. We prove that it takes O(n lnn) slots for “Omniscient
scheme” - the one that knows proofs and alibis immediately
after created without any message exchange - to detect one
atomic jammer. We practically propose two other schemes that
need to exchange proofs and alibis and prove that they can still
achieve O(n lnn) time slots for detecting the atomic jammer.
We also verify our analysis in ns2 simulation.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are
• The concept of “atomic jammer” as the foundation of
designing jamming defense.
• The concept of alibi and the design of alibi-based proto-
cols to detect one atomic jammer.
• The theoretical analysis and simulation-based perfor-
mance evaluation of alibi-based protocols
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start
with the system model including network model, jammer
model and problem formulation in Section II. We present the
general alibi framework including the basic ideas, examples
and desired properties for any alibi-based protocols in Section
III. In Section IV, we propose four alibi-based protocols
and comprehensive analysis for each protocol with respect to
the desired properties. In Section V, we give some further
extensions such as lossy channels and a more generalized
attacker’s strategy. We evaluate the proposed protocols in
Section VI. In Section VII, we conclude our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
This section presents our system model. Notations used in
this paper can be found in Table II.
A. Network Model
We consider a single-hop wireless network that has n nodes
N1..Nn and a base station (BS) in which nodes can hear
each other directly (i.e. in one hop) as shown in Figure
1(a). All nodes talk to the BS via a pre-defined channel,
referred to as the main channel M. They use a simple
Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) to access the shared
wireless medium. Specifically, there will be n slots of size
s in a round. Each slot is uniquely pre-assigned to a node.
Nodes only transmit in their assigned time slots. Figure 1(b)
gives an illustration of this simple TDMA scheduling. We
assume nodes are time-synchronized (by GPS2, for example).
Thus, this simple TDMA scheduling will cause no collisions.
However, it is worth noting that extension to other scheduling
such as more complicated TDMA or CSMA/CA is possible
but that is orthogonal to the problem addressed in this paper.
Nodes in the network have a set of m orthogonal channels
Γ = {C1, ...Cm} that they can switch to. These channels
may not be necessarily contingent in frequency. For 802.11b,
this set is the channel {1, 6, 12}. We also assume a constant
channel switching delay and denote it as τ .
2The accuracy of the clock synchronization using GPS is µs
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Fig. 1. Network Model
B. Jammer Model
In order to build an effective defense strategy, one must
understand the capabilities of the attacker. For jamming at-
tacks, there are various factors forming the capabilities of a
jammer. Power level of the transmitter, the frequencies that the
transmitter can transmit on, frequency switching delay and the
knowledge about the network (i.e. insider-based or outsider-
based) are several important factors for the jammer.
We model a jammer by the knowledge he knows about the
network and the number of channels that he can jam simul-
taneously. The former concerns “‘outsider-based” or “insider-
based” knowledge. The latter will lead to a novel concept in
our jamming model: the “atomic” jammer.
1) Outsider-based & Insider-based jammer: Outsider-
based jammer is the one that jams the communication channel
without knowing the shared secret such as the hopping pattern.
Literally, this attacker can be defended against efficiently by
the current state-of-the-art [13][22][19]. Insider-based jammer
is the one that knows the shared secret such as the hopping
pattern and can jam the communication very efficiently. In the
previous example, where the network uses frequency hopping
for jamming mitigation and the jammer knows the shared
hopping pattern, the jammer can hop to the same channel as
other nodes do and jams the communication at any time. Even
worse, if the jammer uses the reactive jamming strategy in
which he only jams after sensing on-going communication,
he may even spend less power and achieve low probability
of getting caught. In this work, we only consider the insider-
based jammers (see Section II-C).
2) Atomic jammers: We also characterize the jammer by the
number of channels in Γ that he can jam simultaneously. In this
way, the strongest jammer is the one that can simultaneously
jam all possible channels in Γ (or even more). The weakest
jammer is the one that can jam only one channel at any time.
We refer to the class of weakest jammers to as the “atomic
jammers”. They are called as “atomic” due to two reasons. Any
stronger jammers can be viewed as multiple “atomic jammers”
with a perfect collusion and coordination. Atomic jammers
cannot be decomposed to any weaker jammers.
An important aspect in our definition is the notion of
“simultaneous timing”. By this, we consider time slots of
size σ in which the jammer’s capabilities are characterized.
Specifically, with this notion, the characterization of a jammer
becomes “the number of channels in Γ that the jammer can
jam in a time slot of size σ”. That means, the capabilities of
a jammer are projected onto the plane (Γ, σ), and the exact
definition of the atomic jammer NJ is the one that can jam
only one channel in Γ within the time slot of size σ3.
To formalize this notion, let CNJ (Γ, σ) denote the number
of channels in Γ that the jammer NJ can jam within a time
slot σ. NJ is said to be a jammer under (Γ, σ) if and only if
CNJ (Γ, σ) > 0, and is an atomic jammer under (Γ, σ) if and
only if CNJ (Γ, σ) = 1.
Let us also denote σmin for the smallest σ that NJ is still a
jammer under (Γ, σmin) and σmax for the largest σ that NJ
is still an atomic jammer under (Γ, σmax). It is followed that
for any σ′ ∈ [σmin, σmax], NJ is an atomic jammer under
(Γ, σ′).
To illustrate how this concept maps to the reality, let us
consider the scenario where the jammer uses an Atheros-
based 802.11a/b/g wireless card as the transmitter to jam a
802.11a network. The only way for the jammer to jam on
two channels is to jam the first channel, switch to the other
channel and jam the second one. To do this, it takes at least
the channel switch delay of the card for the jammer to do
jamming, even if we ignore the time to damage packets on
the targeted channels. Because the channel switching delay for
an 802.11/a/b/g wireless card is between 1-4ms, the jammer
cannot jam on two different channels within the time slot size
of 1ms. Thus, if σ = 1ms, the jammer is the atomic jammer
under (Γ, σ = 1ms).
The novel concept of atomic jammer is important in several
ways. First, it abstracts the jamming capabilities of the jammer
composed by several factors: the power level of the transmitter,
the frequency set that it can transmit on, the channel switching
delay and many more. This abstraction helps the jamming
defense to avoid considering multiple factors at the same time
and thus complicating the problem. Second, this concept even
helps to quantify the strength of the jammer according to the
number of channels in Γ he can jam simultaneously. In this
way, a jamming defense can be specifically designed to defend
against certain classes of jammers and thus a quantifiable
jamming defense. Lastly, the relationship between atomic and
3The relationship between σ and s will be discussed in III-C
strong jammers is particularly helpful for jamming defense.
Specifically, any jamming defense scheme that can deal with
atomic jammers can always be extended to deal with stronger
jammers.
C. Problem Formulation
The problem we consider in this paper is detecting one
insider-based atomic jammer. The jammer NJ has the knowl-
edge of any protocols used in the system and any shared
secrets among the network. Thus, we assume he is one of
the nodes in the network. That means NJ ∈ {N1...Nn} and
the problem is to find him.
There will be several aspects of this problem to be con-
sidered. Certain properties such as detection time, false alarm
probability, miss detection probability and overhead will be
discussed in Section III-E. We will first consider this problem
under the lossless channel condition and extend it to lossy
channel in Section V.
III. ALIBI’S FRAMEWORK
A. Basic Idea
The basic idea is to exploit the limited capabilities of the
atomic jammer NJ : he cannot jam two channels simultane-
ously. Specifically, if he jams on the main channel in a time
slot, he cannot send on another channel in the same time slot.
This opens a chance for good nodes to prove their honesty.
Nodes occasionally switch to and transmit on another channel
(when idle) to prove that they were transmitting on another
channel while the main channel was jammed in a time slot. In
this way, only good nodes can prove their honesty while the
atomic jammer can never do that. Eventually, all good nodes
are proved to be honest and the jammer NJ is identified.
An analogy to this idea can be found in crime investigation
where the detective can gather all possible suspects and knows
for sure one of them must be the criminal. If any suspect can
show a trusted proof showing that he was seen at another place
at the time the crime was committed, he can be out of the
investigation. Unless the detective can find out a trusted proof
of the criminal, he has to keep gathering proofs until there is
one suspect left in the pool who cannot get any trusted proof
to make the conclusion. We call such trusted proofs as alibi
and people seeing him as witnesses.
In alibi scheme, a new channel A ∈ Γ\{M}, called as
alibi channel, is used for good nodes to create proofs and
alibis. The time slots of alibi channel also have size of s
and are aligned with the main channel. The channel access
scheduling and nodes’ behavior are different. In any time slot,
nodes in the network play only one in four possible roles in
the alibi framework: M-defendant - the scheduled sender on
the main channel M , A-defendant - the scheduled sender on
the alibi channel A, M-witness - the nodes voluntarily deciding
to become a witness on the main channel and A-witness - the
nodes voluntarily deciding to become a witness on the alibi
channel. Nodes randomly choose to play one of the role with
a pre-defined probability. However, the jammer can play any
role he likes. Also, for the shake of the simplicity, we assume
each node is uniquely assigned to be the M-defendant in each
time slot (i.e. no collisions on the alibi channel).
In any time slot, for a node that is not assigned to be M-
defendant or A-defendant, it decides to switch to the main
channel M or switch to alibi channel A, with a certain
probability, to become a M-witness or A-witness, respectively.
For any time slot, M-witnesses overhear the main channel
M and record whether the main channel is jammed (by the
jammer), is occupied (by the M-defendant) or is empty in this
time slot. M-witnesses store these records, which are called
M-proofs. A M-proof basically keeps the state of the main
channel at a specific time slot. A-witnesses will also do a
similar thing on the alibi channel A to create A-proofs. M-
proofs and A-proofs of the same time slot are exchanged and
combined. While there are various state combinations of M-
proofs and A-proofs, the only useful proof combination is
when a M-proof shows a jammed state at time slot t and
an A-proof shows an occupied state by an A-defendant Ni at
time slot t. Such combination shows that Ni cannot be the
jammer and is referred to as alibi of Ni at the given time slot.
Alibis for nodes are accumulatively created until the jammer
is identified.
B. An Example
Figure 2 shows an example of how the basic alibi scheme
works for a network of 5 nodes where the jammer is N5.
The figure has three parts: the details of the main channel at
the top, the details of the alibi channel in the middle and the
details of proofs and alibis at each local node at the bottom.
The right most part explains the symbols used in the figure.
Details are shown in time. A column going from the top part
to the bottom part is the snapshot of every part in that time
slot.
The main channel is scheduled as round-robin, i.e. each
node is assigned a slot turn-by-turn. The jammer (N5) also
has a time slot. Similarly, on the alibi channel, each node is
pre-assigned a slot to send in each round. “X” denotes for
a jam action of the jammer (N5). For example, in the first
round, the first four slots are jammed and “X”symbols are
placed on top of them. “E” denotes for an “empty” slot where
no activity is recorded. An example is the 4th slot of the first
round on the alibi channel, the jammer is busy jamming on the
main channel and cannot send any other packets on the alibi
channel. “M” and “A” denote M-defendant and A-defendant
in that time slot.
Let us now go through the first three time slots of the first
round. In the first time slot, node N1 is the M-defendant and
node N2 is A-defendant. There is no M-witnesses and two
A-witnesses: N3 and N4. In this time slot, the jammer (N5)
jams the main channel (the “X” symbol). By the end of this
time slot, N1, N2 marks themselves as a M-defendant and A-
defendant, respectively. N3, N4 hear N2 on the alibi channel
so they create a proof showing that N2 is the A-defendant in
this time slot. If we assume all proofs are gathered to a central
entity (e.g. an “oracle” entity), nothing cannot be concluded
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Fig. 2. An illustration of Alibi scheme
from this first time slot. The main channel was jammed but
no one was the M-witness so no alibi can be made.
Let us now go to the second time slot. In this time slot,
N2 is M-defendant. N1 is A-defendant. N4 is M-witness. N3
is A-witness. The main channel is jammed in this time slot.
Thus, N4 records a “X”. N3 hears N1 on the alibi channel
and creates a proof showing that he saw N1 was sending on
alibi channel at time slot 2. If proofs, created and held by N3
and N4 are combined, then one can conclude that N1 cannot
be the jammer. Thus, N1 has an alibi.
Similarly for the third time slot, if proofs created by N1
and N2 are combined, one can conclude that N4 cannot be
the jammer and thus can create an alibi for N4. For the rest of
the time slots, nodes in the network will follow this protocol
and keep creating alibis. Eventually, by the end of time slot
11, each honest node has an alibi and one can conclude that
N5 is the jammer.
Apparently, this example only illustrates how the basic
protocol works. There are several issues that have to be consid-
ered. For example, how should proofs and alibis be exchanged
and combined? How fast can the jammer be detected? Is
there any false alarm or miss detection? These issues will
be discussed in details in Section IV. In the next subsequent
sections, we present a necessary condition for the alibi to work,
a more detailed descriptions on roles, proofs and alibis and a
set of desired properties to evaluate any alibi-based protocols
proposed later.
C. Necessary condition
The necessary condition for the alibi scheme to work is that
the slot size s of slotted scheduling has to be equal or less than
the slot size σ of the atomic jammer NJ :
s ≤ σ.
This obviously imposes a constraint - a required strength for
the defense - on the network. In the previous example of
802.11, the slot size specified in the standard [19] is in the
order of microseconds which is smaller than the σ = 1ms of
the atomic jammer. Thus, this satisfies the necessary condition
for any alibi-based protocol to possibly defend against the
jamming with σ = 1ms.
Another condition is on the channel switching delay τ of
the nodes. If τ ≤ s, then nodes can always decide and switch
at the beginning of each slot. However, if s < τ ≤ ks, where
k = 2..n− 1, then nodes have to schedule in advance if they
want to switch another channel. Specifically, if it wants to
switch at t, it has to schedule to switch at time t−τ . Obviously,
this will limit the possible witnesses at each time slot and thus
affect the performance of the detection algorithm. However,
in this paper we only consider the case where τ ≤ s for the
simplicity of the algorithms and proofs. The effect of larger
value of τ will be considered in the future work.
D. Roles, Proofs & Alibis
1) Roles: As just discussed, a node can play one of four
roles M-defendant, A-defendant, M-witness and A-witness in a
time slot. M-defendant role is basically the sender on the main
channel which is already assigned by the TDMA scheduling.
A-defendant role can be assigned similar to the simple TDMA
scheduling on the main channel to avoid unnecessary collisions
or can be done in a distributed manner by each node. We will
show later that the former is vulnerable to slander attacks even
though it can yield much faster detection time (see Section IV-
A). In the latter assignment scheme, in each time slot a node
decides to be an A-defendant with uniform probability pAD.
In this way, while there may be collisions on the alibi channel,
it still works pretty well as shown in Section IV. Furthermore,
it has an advantage of confusion because the attacker cannot
predict who will be the A-defendant at any time slot. This is
crucial to avoid the slander attack successfully on the central
assignment.
In time slots that nodes do not play any defendant roles,
they will play witness roles. Specifically, each node becomes
an A-witness with a probability pAW and becomes an M-
witness with a probability (1− pAW ).
Defendants broadcast messages overheard by witnesses.
The broadcast message sent by defendants has the id field
(and other fields specified later in Section IV). The id is a
unique identifier for a node such as the MAC address. For
M-defendants, the id is already included in the messages sent
to the BS on main channel M . For A-defendants, they have
to explicitly send messages including id.
2) Proofs: Witnesses receive messages from defendants,
extract id field if possible, include the timestamps and store
them locally as proofs. Specifically, proofs have the following
format
(state : 16bit,#timeslot : 16bit)
where state is the state of the channel and #timeslot
specifies timestamp when the state was recorded. Possible
values of state is listed in Table I.
3) Alibis: Proofs are exchanged and combined to form
alibis. Possible combinations of proofs are shown in Figure 3.
While there are 16 possible combinations, only two of them
can lead to creation of alibis. Those two cases - the two cells
with shadow background - are when one channel (either main
channel M or alibi channel A) is witnessed to be jammed
and another channel has a defendant observed by at least one
witness.
There are several interesting aspects of other combinations.
The “M” column always leads to “not trusted” combination
because the jammer can both jam and declare himself as a de-
fendant in the same time slot. That is why the defendants have
to be overheard by witnesses and only proofs about defendants
created by witnesses are trusted. A similar conclusion applies
to “A” row.
The “E” column can indicate a suspect behavior of the node
assigned to send proofs for its M-defendant role in this time
slot. Unfortunately, no conclusion can be made because we
cannot distinguish this case with the case where the good node
does not have anything to send on the main channel.
The cell of the first row and first column is special: it
has two corrupted packets on both channels. This situation
only happens when the jammer jams on the main channel
and there is a collision on the alibi channel. Obviously, if we
assume a perfect TDMA scheduling on the alibi channel where
no collisions can happen, this combination is unreachable.
However, as shown later, this situation can happen when a
random access mechanism is used on the alibi channel to avoid
slander attacks.
E. Desired Properties
Desired properties for any alibi-based protocols are as
follows.
AbnormalNormal
Not trusted
No A-
defendants
“E”
Abnormal
NormalNot trusted
Alibi(J)“#J”
AbnormalNormalNot trustedNot trusted“A”
AbnormalAlibi(I)Not trusted
Channel M 
jammed/
Collisions on 
Channel A
“X”
“E”“#I”“M”“X”
Channel M
Channel A
Fig. 3. State Combination
1) Completeness: Completeness property specifies that all
alive and honest nodes eventually conclude who the jammer
is. This property basically implies the termination condition.
In our work we will consider two termination conditions of
proposed alibi-based protocols.
• Termination condition T1: Each alive and honest nodes
has at least one alibi held by some honest nodes.
• Termination condition T2: All honest nodes conclude the
identification of the jammer.
The condition T2 is harder to achieve because each node has
to collect enough alibis of other nodes to identify the jammer.
2) Accuracy: This property is concerned about the
false alarm and miss detection of any alibi-based proto-
cols. Specifically, any alibi-based protocols must show that
P [false alarm] and P [miss detection] are bounded.
3) Detection time: This property is concerned about the
time to detect the jammer. Specifically, any alibi-based proto-
cols must show that the time to detect is bounded and smaller
detection time implies better performance.
Intuitively, the detection time depends directly on the speed
of creation new alibis. Alibis are created from useful combi-
nations of proofs on main and alibi channels. Therefore, the
detection time is affected by the number of slots jammed and
the number of successful A-defendants.
4) Availability: This property defines fraction of time the
main channel is available for communication. If the main
channel is always jammed, the availability is zero. If it is not
jammed at all, the availability is 100%. This property and the
previous property - the detection time - altogether imply the
jammer strategy.
The jammer may decide to jam the main channel in a
fraction of time. The more he jams on the main channel, the
more he can damage the main channel at the cost of being
detected faster. The only way for him to avoid getting caught
is to stop the jamming action, which apparently lead to 100%
availability of the main channel. The jammer may also decide
to jam on the alibi channel in a fraction of time. This is
equivalent to reduce the fraction of time he jams on the main
channel (due to atomic jammer’s limited capabilities) and thus
increases the availability of the main channel.
Choosing how much to jam and what pattern to jam forms
the strategy of the jammer. A smart jammer may have an
State Possible channels Description
“X” M (or A) The node saw a corrupted packet at that time due to either jamming effect or a collision on channel M (or A)
“M” M The node was M-defendant
“A” A The node was A-defendant
“#i” M (or A) The node saw Ni broadcasted a defendant message on channel M (or A)
“E” M (or A) The node did not see any activities
TABLE I
POSSIBLE VALUES OF STATES RECORDED BY WITNESSES
adaptive strategy to maximize possible damage on the main
channel while minimizing probability of getting caught. This is
out of scope of this paper and will be considered in the future
work. In this work, we consider a simple strategy where the
attacker jams the main channel all the time.
5) Scalability: This property specifies how much overhead
is incurred in an alibi-based protocol and thus how well it
scales with the network size. Specifically, it measures how
many extra messages have to be sent for alibi schemes for a
given network size.
IV. ALIBI PROTOCOLS
In this paper, we propose four alibi-based protocols. The
first one is the TDMA-like shuffle protocol. This protocol
assumes a random TDMA scheduling on the alibi channel.
While this protocol is vulnerable to the slander attack, it
motivates the need for other three protocols. The proof of its
detection time is also easy to follow and is the base proof of
the detection time of other protocols. The other three protocols
we proposed use the random access mechanism on the alibi
channel. The Omniscient protocol assumes an “Omniscient
entity” who can gather and combine proofs to create alibis. The
K-Propagation protocol is more practical than the Omniscient
protocol in that it does not assume proofs are globally known
immediately after their creation. Essentially, in this protocol,
proofs in K previous time slots are included in the messages
sent by defendants and appropriately combined to create alibis.
However, this protocol only addresses the T1 termination
condition. It does not work well with the T2 termination
condition like the L-gossiping protocol does. The L-gossiping
protocol extends the K-propagation protocol in that it adds the
exchange of alibis to speed up the detection time for the T2
termination condition.
A. TDMA-like shuffle Protocol
The TDMA-like shuffle protocol assumes a random TDMA
scheduling on the alibi channel. In each round, each node
has a unique assigned time slot like TDMA but the order
of time slot maybe different from round to round. In other
words, in each round the slot assignment in the alibi channel
is a random permutation of the TDMA schedule on the main
channel. In the subsequent sections, first we will analyze the
performance of this protocol. Then, we will show that this
protocol is vulnerable to the slander attacks and thus leads to
a need for more robust randomized alibi-based protocols.
Theorem 1. Under the T1 termination condition and lossless
channel condition, the expected detection time of the TDMA-
like shuffle protocol is O(n ln(n)) time slots with high prob-
ability.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 (Slander attacks). The TDMA-like shuffle protocol
is vulnerable to the slander attacks. Specifically, there exists a
strategy for the jammer to defame a good node and to make
this protocol never terminate (i.e. detection time to infinity).
Proof. Because the shuffle TDMA scheduling on the alibi
channel is known for every node, including the jammer NJ .
He can defame a node Ni (i 6= j) as follows. Whenever Ni
becomes an A-defendant, NJ will stop the jamming action n
the main channel. Thus, Ni will never be able to get an alibi
because there is always no jamming activity when he is the
A-defendant. NJ can also do this for a set of good nodes to
make the protocol never terminate.
B. Random access alibi-based protocols
As shown in the previous sections, the problem of TDMA-
like shuffle protocol is the predictable schedule on the alibi
channel. Thus, the scheduling on the alibi channel needs to
be randomized to give more confusion to the attacker. In the
subsequent sections, we explore the use of random access on
the alibi channel. Interestingly, as shown later, this class of
protocols can achieve O(n lnn) time slots for the detection
time. Even for very practical protocols where proofs and alibis
are exchanged, the detection time is still the same order of
magnitude.
In an alibi-based protocol employing random medium ac-
cess mechanism on the alibi channel, a node becomes an A-
defendant with a probability pAD = 1n in each time slot.
Also, because if a node is not a defendant, it will become
an A-witness or a M-witness with probability pAW = 12 . This
simple strategy has an advantage of unpredictability of who
is the A-defendant in each time slot. This advantage helps to
avoid the slander attacks. However, it comes with the cost of
slower detection time due to collisions on the alibi channel.
C. Omniscient Protocol
The Omniscient protocol assumes an “omniscient entity”
who knows proofs right after they are created. This Omniscient
entity then can combine proofs to make alibis. The protocol is
terminated until the Omniscient gathers enough n−1 different
alibis to make the conclusion about the jammer. Apparently,
this scheme should achieve fastest average detection time in
this class of protocols because there is no delay for exchanging
and combining proofs. It is also important to emphasize that
the Omniscient protocol performs the same under either T1 or
T2 condition because all proofs are centrally and omnisciently
gathered.
Theorem 3 (Detection time of the Omniscient protocol).
Under the T1 termination condition and lossless channel
condition, for the Omniscient scheme, the fastest detection time
is when pAD = 1n and pAW =
1
2 and is O(n ln(n)) time slots
with high probability.
Proof. See Appendix.
D. K-propagation Protocol
K-propagation protocol removes the unrealistic assumption
about the “omniscient entity”. In K-propagation protocol, each
node keeps proofs it has created from the last K slots. Each
node also includes these K-proofs into the proof messages
it sends when becoming a defendant (see Section III-D).
Therefore, proofs will have following format
(state : 16bit,#timeslot : 16bit, state1, ..., statek : 16bit).
This format contains the format shown in Section III-D plus
the K states from the last K slots.
Obviously, an issue with this protocol is that the size of
exchanged messages grow with K - the number of proofs
each node keeps for exchanging and combining. A constraint
for K is that it has to be small enough such that the slot
size does not exceed the σmax and thus meets the necessary
condition specified in Section III-C. Because this constraint
varies according to the system’s and attacker’s parameters, the
performance of K-propagation protocol also changes with K.
Thus, to get a more predictable performance, we now will give
an analysis for the case when K = 1. 1-propagation has a
deterministic overhead and its performance is an upper bound
for any K-propagation protocol where K > 1.
Surprisingly, we found that the 1-propagation protocol still
achieves O(n lnn) time slots for detection time under T1
termination condition.
Theorem 4 (Detection time of 1-propagation protocol under
T1 termination condition). Under the T1 termination condition
and lossless channel condition, the fastest expected detection
time is when pAD = 1n and pAW =
1
2 and is O(n lnn) time
slots with high probability.
Proof. See Appendix.
However, 1-propagation is much slower under T2 termina-
tion condition. Under T2 condition, each node has to gather
enough n − 1 different alibis of the other nodes to make
the conclusion. This step will require at least (n − 1) ×
((n − 1) ln(n − 1) + O(n)) slots for each honest node.
Furthermore, the protocol only terminates when all honest
nodes can make the conclusion. Thus, under the T2 condition,
this 1-propagation protocol performs much slower, at least
slower with in the order of n. Therefore, we propose L-
gossiping protocol to speed up the detection time under T2
condition.
E. L-gossiping Protocol
L-gossiping protocol speeds up the detection time under T2
termination condition by exchanging alibis among nodes. In
K-propagation protocol, each node keeps a bitmap of size n
in which bit ith indicates that node Ni has an alibi. Similar
to K-propagation protocol, each node also includes an array
of identifiers randomly picked in its bitmap of size n into the
proofs it sends when becoming a defendant (see Section III-
D). Specifically, each node uniformly randomly picks L bits
in its bitmap and includes only identifers corresponding with
the picked 1-bits. Therefore, the format of the proof message
is now extended to
(state : 16bit,#timeslot : 16bit, state1, ..., statek :
16bit, no.id : 16bit, id1, ...idno.id : 16bit)
where no. id is the number of identifiers following after this
field and idi is the identifier of node Nidi that has alibi.
Similar to K-propagation protocol, L-protocol gossiping
also has an issue of message size keeping growing with
L. Thus, L has to be small enough so that the necessary
condition in Section III-C is not violated. Also, because the
performance of this protocol depends much on the chosen
value K according to system’s and attacker’s parameters, it is
more interesting to investigate the performance of 1-gossiping
protocol.
Theorem 5 (Detection time of 1-gossiping protocol under T2
termination condition). Under the T2 termination condition
and lossless channel condition, for 1-gossiping protocol, the
fastest detection time is when pAD = 1n and pAW =
1
2 and is
O(n ln(n)) time slots with high probability.
Proof. See Appendix.
V. OTHER PROPERTIES AND EXTENSION OF RANDOM
ACCESS ALIBI-BASED PROTOCOLS
A. False Alarm and Miss Detection rate
Theorem 6. The false alarm and miss detection rates of the
Omniscient protocol, the K-propagation protocol and the L-
gossiping protocol are zero under lossless channel condition.
For lossy channel model with pl loss rate for both channels,
the false alarm and miss detection rates are pl.
Proof. See Appendix.
B. Extension to a generalized jammer’s strategy
In the strategy considered in the above sections, the jammer
is assumed to jam the main channel all the time. We now
consider a generalized strategy in which the jammer only jams
a pm fraction of time on the main channel and a pa fraction
of time on the alibi channel. It is important to note that it does
not matter the exact slots the jammer jams - only the fraction
matters.
In general, the results derived for random access alibi-based
protocols do not change much. Specifically, it only slows down
the detection process because the number of potential slots
that can lead to creation of alibis is proportionally reduced as
shown in the following lemma. This will also affect the false
alarm and miss detection probability.
Theorem 7 (Generalized jammer’s strategy). If the atomic
jammer jams pm fraction of time on the main channel and
pa fraction of time on the alibi channel (pm + pa ≤ 1),
the detection speed of Omniscient protocol, K-propagation
protocol and L-gossiping protocol is reduced by a factor of
pm and the availability is 1− pm.
Proof. See Appendix.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed protocols in ns2. We extend the
built-in TDMA protocol in ns2 to implement the proposed
alibi-based protocols. The packet size is 128 bytes. The
bandwidth is 1Mbps. The slot size can handle a 256-byte
packet. The number of nodes n is varied from 10 to 500.
The attack jams the main channel all the time. We repeat the
experiments 5 times to get the average and plot them on the
graphs.
The detection time is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4(a) and
4(b) show the detection time in number of slots and seconds,
respectively. Omniscient protocol has the smallest detection
time as expected. 1-propagation is the next fast scheme. 1-
gossiping is the slowest because it needs both 1-propagation
process and gossiping process. It is important to note that the
detection time of all schemes are bounded within 20n log(n)
as shown in the Figure 4(a).
The message overhead incurred by the three alibi-based
protocols is shown in Figure 5. Omniscient protocol has least
message overhead and is the base line for any alibi-based
protocol due to the assumption of global knowledge. The
message overhead of 1-propagation and 1-gossiping is not
much compared to the Omniscient protocol. The crucial point
in this figure is that the message overhead grows linear with
the network size. It shows a good scalability of alibi-based
protocols.
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VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown a novel way to deal with insider-based jam-
ming attacks. We have proposed a class of alibi-based proto-
cols to detect the atomic jammers. Omniscient, 1-propagation
and 1-gossiping protocol are shown to achieve O(n ln(n))
time slots, zero false alarm and zero miss detection under the
lossless channel condition. We also consider some practical
aspects of these protocols under lossy channel condition and
a more generalized jammer’s strategy. We also show that
simulation results in ns2 confirm our analysis.
The encouraging results in this paper are just a starting
point. Dealing with stronger jammers, more general MAC
protocol, multi-hops are some possible research directions.
Some practical aspects such as channel switching delay have
to be taken into account. Tighter bounds of detection time can
be further investigated.
VIII. APPENDIX
Fact 1. For any y ≥ 1 and |x| ≤ 1, we have
(1− x2y)exy ≤ (1 + x)y ≤ exy
Lemma 1. Let c > 0 be a constant, m = n lnn + cn for a
positive integer n. Then for any constant k, we have
lim
n→∞
(
n
k
)
(1− k
n
)m =
exp(−ck)
k!
Proof. By the formula above, we have
(1− k
2m
n2
) exp(−km
n
) ≤ (1− k
n
)m ≤ exp(−km
n
)
We have limn→∞(1 − k2mn ) = 1 and exp(−km/n) =
n−k exp(−ck). Also,
lim
n→∞
(
n
k
)
k!
nk
= lim
n→∞
n(n− 1)...(n− k + 1)
nk
= 1
Thus,
lim
n→∞
(
n
k
)
(1− k
n
)m = lim
n→∞
nk
k!
exp(−km
n
)
= lim
n→∞
nk
k!
n−k exp(−ck) = exp(−ck)
k!
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof has two steps. In the first step,
we will find out the probability of a given slot to get an
(unnecessarily new) alibi and what is the maximum value
of this probability. In the second step, we will calculate the
expected number of slots such that each node gets an alibi by
some nodes and prove that the expectation happens with very
high probability. The analysis in the second step is similar
to the analysis of the well-known coupon collector’s problem
[23].
Let us denote pshuﬄealibi as the probability of a given slot to
get an alibi. Due to the TDMA-like shuffle protocol on the
alibi channel, there is always an A-defendant in any time slot.
Thus, for a given time slot, the alibi is created only when
 0
 5000
 10000
 15000
 20000
 50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500
N
um
be
r o
f s
lo
ts
Network Size (n)
Omniscient
1-Propagation (T1 condition)
1-Gossiping (T2 condition)
20nlog(n)
(a) Detection time in #slots
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500
D
et
ec
tio
n 
tim
e 
(se
co
nd
s)
Network Size (n)
Omniscient
1-Propagation (T1 condition)
1-Gossiping (T2 condition)
(b) Detection time in seconds
Fig. 4. Detection Time
the main channel is jammed witnessed by at least one M-
witness and the alibi channel has an A-defendant witnessed by
at least one A-witness. The probability of the channel to get
jammed is always 1 due to the considered jammer’s strategy.
The probability of at least one A-witness and one M-witness,
denoted as pW , is
pW = 1− pn−3AW − (1− pAW )n−3.
Thus,
pshuﬄealibi = 1× pW = 1− pn−3AW − (1− pAW )n−3. (1)
Because pshuﬄealibi is the probability of getting an alibi in any
time slot, we want to maximize it. Because pshuﬄealibi is the
function of pAW for any given n, by applying first and second
derivative it is easy to see that pshuﬄealibi is maximized when
pAW = 12 . Thus, p
shuﬄe
alibi → 1 exponentially as n increases.
We now proceed to step 2. In this step, we want to calculate
the expected number of slots Eshuﬄe to ensure that each node
has at least one alibi. For any node Ni, i = 1..n,Ni 6= NJ ,,
Pr[Ni does not have any alibi in the first Eshuﬄe slots ] =
(1− pshufflealibin−1 )E
shuffle ≈ e−
pshufflealibi E
shuffle
n−1
Thus, the expected number of different alibis after Eshuﬄe
slots is
(n− 1)(1− e−
pshufflealibi E
shuffle
n−1 )
Therefore, the expected number of different alibis when
Eshuﬄe = (n− 1) ln(n− 1) + c(n− 1), c > 0 is
E[#alibis] = (n− 1)− e−c (2)
The Equation 2 essentially shows that after (n− 1) ln(n−
1) + c(n− 1), the expected number of different alibis is very
close to n− 1. In other words, each honest node gets at least
one alibi after that many slots.
We now show that indeed, after Eshuﬄe = (n − 1) ln(n −
1) + c(n − 1) slots, each node gets at least one alibi with
high probability. Specifically, if we denote Xn−1 the number
of slots such that each node of n− 1 nodes gets at least one
alibi, we will prove that
Pr[Xn−1 > Eshuﬄe] = 1− exp(−e−c)
Let Eshuﬄei denote the event that node Ni does not have
any alibis after Eshuﬄe slots, we have
Pr[Xn−1 > Eshuﬄe] = Pr
[n−1⋃
i=1
Eshuﬄei
]
. By inclusion-exclusion, we have
Pr
[n−1⋃
i=1
Eshuﬄei
]
=
n−1∑
i=1
(−1)i+1Fn−1i ,
where
Fn−1j =
∑
1≤i1<i2...<ij≤n−1
Pr
[ j⋂
k=1
Eshuﬄeik
]
Let Sn−1k =
∑k
i=1(−1)i+1Fn−1i . We know that
Sn−12k ≤ Pr
[⋃
i
Eshuﬄei
] ≤ Sn−12k+1
.
By symmetry,
Fn−1k =
(
n− 1
k
)
Pr
[ k⋂
l=1
Eshuﬄel
]
=
(
n− 1
k
)
(1− k
n− 1)
Eshuffle .
Thus, Fk = limn→∞ Fn−1k = exp−ck/k!, by Lemma 1.
Let
Sk =
k∑
j=1
(−1)j+1Fj =
k∑
j=1
(−1)j+1 exp(−cj)
j!
Clearly, limk→∞ Sk = 1 − exp(−e−c) by the Taylor
expansion of exp(x) for x = −e−c. Indeed,
exp(x) =
∞∑
j=0
xj
j!
=
∞∑
j=0
(−e−c)j
j!
= 1 +
∞∑
j=0
(−1)je−cj
j!
Clearly, limn→∞ Sn−1k = Sk and limk→∞ Sk = 1 −
exp(−e−c). Thus, we have
lim
n→∞Pr[X > E
shuﬄe] = lim
n→∞
[n−1⋃
i=1
Eshuﬄei
]
= lim
n→∞ limk→∞
Sn−1k = lim
k→∞
Sk = 1− exp(−e−c)
.
Proof of Theorem 3. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, this
proof has also two steps. In the first step, we need to calculate
the probability pomniscientalibi to get an alibi in any given time
slot and when it is maximized. Since the second step is very
similar to the second step of Theorem 1, we will omit some
redundant proofs.
An alibi is created only when there is an M-defendant, an
A-defendant, at least one M-witness and one A-witness. For
a given time slot, the probability of having an M-defendant
is 1 due to the TDMA scheduling. The probability of having
an A-defendant is (n− 2)pAD(1− pAD)n−2 (n-2 because the
jammer and the M-defendant is excluded). The probability of
having at least an A-witness and an M-witness is
pW = 1− pn−3AW − (1− pAW )n−3.
Thus,
pomniscientalibi = (n−2)pAD(1−pAD)n−2(1−pn−3AW−(1−pAW )n−3).
We now want to see pomniscientalibi is maximized at what value
of pAD and pAW . Let us consider the term pAD(1−pAD)n−2.
The derivative of the function with respect to the variable pAD
is
(1− pAD)n−3(−npAD + pAD + 1)
Because 0 < pAD < 1, the term pAD(1 − pAD)n−2 is
maximized only when pAD = 1/(n−1). Similarly, as shown in
Theorem 1, the term (1−pn−3AW −(1−pAW )n−3) is maximized
when pAW = 1/2. By substituting pAD = 1/n and pAW =
1/2, we will get
pomniscientalibi =
n− 2
n− 1(1−
1
n− 1)
n−2(1− (1
2
)n−2)
Since (1 − 1n−1 )n−2 = (n−2n−1 )n−2 ≥ 1e and ( 12 )n−2
approaches 0 exponentially as n increases, the term pomniscientalibi
approaches 1 exponentially as n increases.
The second step of Theorem 1 is similar to the second step
of the proof of Theorem 1. However, the detection time of
the Omniscient scheme is larger than that of the TDMA-like
shuffle scheme because the pomniscientalibi < p
shuﬄe
alibi .
Proof of Theorem 4. Similar to the proofs of Theorem 1
and Theorem 3, we start with calculating the probability
p1-propagationalibi of getting an alibi for any given time slot. Let
us first calculate, at a given time slot k, the probability of two
potential proofs (i.e. the proofs whose combination would turn
into an alibi). Then, we will calculate the probability of those
two proofs to be combined in the next time slot because they
can be only propagated at most one time slot (1-propagation).
Let SM (k), SA(k), RM (k), RA(k) be the set of M-
defendants, A-defendants, M-witnesses and A-witnesses at
time k, respectively. We have
RA(k) ∪RM (k) = {N1...Nn}\{SA(k), SM (k), NJ}
|RA(k)|+ |RM (k)| = n− 3
RA(k) ∩RM (k) = 0
Denote palibi(k − 1) as the probability of getting two
potential proofs (i.e. those whose combination would turn into
an alibi), palibi(k|k − 1) as the probability of getting an alibi
at slot k from the two proofs propagated from slot k− 1. We
have
p1-propagationalibi (k) = palibi(k − 1)× palibi(k|k − 1) (3)
The first term palibi(k − 1) is the same as pomniscientalibi . The
second term is
palibi(k|k − 1) =
|RA(k − 1)|pAD(1− pAD)n−2(1− (1− pAW )|RM (k−1)|)
+|RM (k − 1)|pAD(1− pAD)n−2(1− (1− pAW )|RA(k−1)|).
The two terms in above equation refer to the two cases that
can transform the two potential proofs to the alibi. The first
case is when one of the A-witnesses in time slot k−1 becomes
the M-defendant in time slot k and one of the M-witnesses in
time slot k−1 becomes the A-witness in the time slot k. After
getting out the common term pAD(1− pAD)n−2, we get
palibi(k|k − 1) = pAD(1− pAD)n−2
×
(
|RA(k − 1)|(1− (1− pAW )|RM (k−1)|)
+|RM (k − 1)|(1− (1− pAW )|RA(k−1)|)
)
= pAD(1− pAD)n−2
×
(
|RA(k − 1)|+ |RM (k − 1)|
−|RA(k − 1)|(1− pAW )|RM (k−1)|
−|RM (k − 1)|(1− pAW )|RA(k−1)|
)
Because |RA(k−1)|(1−pAW )|RM (k−1)|+RM (k−1)|(1−
pAW )|RA(k−1)| is maximized when either |RA(k− 1)| = 1 or
|RA(k − 1)| = n− 4, we have
palibi(k|k − 1) ≥ pAD(1− pAD)n−2
×(1− (1− pAW )n−4 + (n− 4)pAW )
≥ pAD(1− pAD)n−2(n− 4)pAW
Substitute into Equation 3 and apply similar proofs shown
in the Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, p1-propagationalibi (k) is max-
imized when pAD = 1/n and pAW = 1/2. Furthermore,
p1-propagationalibi (k) will also approach 1 exponentially as n
increases.
The second step of this proof is similar to the second step
of the proof of Theorem 3. Thus, in 1-propagation scheme,
after (n− 1) ln(n− 1) + f(n− 1) slots, for any f > 0, each
node will get at least one alibi with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 5. The difference of this lemma and Theo-
rem 4 is the termination condition. Thus, for any f > 0, after
(n − 1) ln(n − 1) + f(n − 1), the probability that each node
has an alibi kept by a node is e−e
−f
(i.e. very high). Let us
now consider the gossiping process separately. We want to see
how many slots it takes to get all alibis gossiped to the whole
network.
Let us now analyze how many steps for the alibis of an
honest node N to get propagated to all other honest nodes.
Denote Xt the number of honest nodes hold an alibi of node
N . That means, (n− 1−Xt) is the number of honest nodes
do not have any alibi of N . Without the loss of generality, we
assume X0 = 1. t = 0 is the time when the first alibi of N is
created.
The alibi gossiping process is similar to the epidemic
process (i.e. the well-known S-curve). At the beginning when
only few nodes hold the alibi of N , the alibi is propagated
slowly. When there are reasonable of nodes holding alibi of
N , the number of new nodes getting propagated will increase
exponentially. At the end, when most of nodes already hold
the alibi, the rate of getting the alibi of N propagated to new
nodes is slow down. Formally, the rate of the alibi gossiping
process can be expressed in the following differential equation.
dE[Xt]
dt
= E[Xt]pAD(1−pAD)n−2× 1
n− 1×(n−1−E[Xt])pAW
(4)
In the Equation 4, the term in the left side expresses the rate
of the alibi gossiping process. In the right hand side, the first
term essentially shows the probability of a “gossiping” node in
Xt that can successfully become an A-defendant and thus be
able to propagate the alibi of N . The second term basically
shows the probability that the alibi of N is picked and is
included in the proofs of the A-defendant. 1n−1 is actually the
lower bound of this probability because the number of alibis
holding by any honest nodes are also less than or equal to
n − 1. The last term in the equation is the number of nodes
among (n− 1−Xt) nodes that do not have the alibi of N to
become the A-witness and thus will get the alibi of N .
Let β = pAD(1 − pAD)n−2 × 1n−1 × pAW ≈ 1(n−1)2
(substituting pAD = 1/n and pAW = 1/2), Equation 4
becomes
dE[Xt]
dt
= βE[Xt]× (n− 1− E[Xt]). (5)
This is a standard differential equation. Solving this equa-
tion gives us
E[Xt] =
n− 1
e−(n−1)βt+C1 + 1
. (6)
where C1 is a constant.
Since X0 = 1, C1 = ln(n− 2) and eC1 = n− 2. Thus, we
have
E[Xt] =
n− 1
(n− 2)e−(n−1)βt + 1 =
n− 1
(n− 2)e−t/(n−1) + 1 .
(7)
If we consider at t′ = g(n− 1) ln(n− 1) for any g > 0, we
have
E[Xt′ ] =
n− 1
(n− 2)e−(g(n−1) ln(n−1))/(n−1) + 1
≈ n− 1
1/ng + 1
≈ (n− 1)(1− 1/ng)
≈ (n− 1)− 1/ng.
That means, after t′ = g(n − 1) ln(n − 1) time slots, the
number of nodes know the alibi of N is very close to n− 1.
By applying the Markov inequality Pr[X ≥ 1] ≤ E[X], we
have
Pr[Xt′ ≤ n−2] = Pr[n−1−Xt′ ≥ 1] ≤ E[n−1−Xt′ ] = n−g.
(8)
Thus, it is shown that after g(n − 1) ln(n − 1) time slots,
the alibi of N is propagated to n − 1 nodes with very
high probability. Furthermore, since we do not make any
assumption about N , this statement applies for every honest
node in the network.
Now, let us consider the overall process which consists of
two sub-processes. The first process is the one 1-propagation
process under T1 condition. Denote T1 the time this process to
finish (i.e., when each node has at least one alibi). In Theorem
4, we proved that
Pr[T1 > (n− 1) ln(n− 1) + c(n− 1)] < 1− e−e−c
The second process of the overall process is the gossiping
process that will start right after the first process finishes (i.e.,
each node has one alibi holding by at least another node).
Denote T2 the number of time slots for the second process to
propagate all the alibis to the whole network. We also have
proved that
Pr[T2 > d(n− 1) ln(n− 1)] < n−d
Let TT (n, c, d) = (n − 1) ln(n − 1) + c(n − 1) + d(n −
1) ln(n − 1) and denote T the time that the overall process
finishes (i.e. when all nodes in the network has all alibis of
other nodes).
Pr[T > TT (n, c, d)]
≤ Pr[(T1 > (n− 1) ln(n− 1) + c(n− 1))
∪(T2 > d(n− 1) ln(n− 1))]
≤ Pr[T1 > (n− 1) ln(n− 1) + c(n− 1)]
+Pr[T2 > d(n− 1) ln(n− 1))]
= 1− e−e−c + n−d
That means, after (n− 1) ln(n− 1)(1 + d) + c(n− 1) time
slots, all nodes are expected to get alibis of all other nodes
with very high probability.
Proof of Theorem 6. A false alarm happens when an honest
node (i.e. victim) is concluded as the jammer. This only
happens when the jammer has the alibi before the victim node
gets its alibi. This implies that the jammer can get an alibi in
some time slot. According to Figure 3, this only happens when
one channel is jammed and the channel has a node, in this
case, the jammer, to transmit its proof. This contradicts with
the capability of the atomic jammer where the jammer cannot
transmit on two channels in any given time slot. Therefore,
under lossless channel condition, false alarm will be zero.
A miss detection happens when the jammer cannot never be
concluded. In other words, the detection time goes to infinity.
This means, there is at least one honest node beside the jammer
that cannot get any alibis. This contradicts with the Theorem
1, Theorem 3 and and Theorem 5. Thus, under the lossless
channel, no miss detection happens.
[Lossy channel] Under the lossy channel, false alarms and
miss detections are possible. In our proposed schemes, a false
alarm happens only when the jammer can get an alibi and
thus avoid getting detected. Thus, the false alarm implies a
miss detection. Similarly, a miss detection happens only when
the jammer gets an alibi at finite time slot. Otherwise, if the
jammer does get any alibis, he will be eventually detected
according to our Theorem 1, Theorem 3 and Theorem 5. Thus,
a miss detection also implies a false alarm.
We now calculate the probability of a jammer to get an
alibi under the lossy channel with the rate pl. In all of
our proposed schemes, the jammer can get an alibi when a
collision happens on the main channel and the jammer tries to
follow the protocol to become the successful defendant on the
alibi channel. In any proposed schemes that use random access
mechanism (i.e. omniscient, 1-propagation and 1-gossiping),
in any given time slot, the probability of a jammer to get an
alibi is
pjammeralibi = pl × (1− pAD)n−1(1− pn−3AW − (1− pAW )n−3) (9)
Because pAD = 1n−1 and pAW = 1/2 are chosen to
maximize the detection probability, we have
pjammeralibi = pl × (1−
1
n− 1)
n−1(1− (1
2
)n−2) (10)
Because (1 − 1n )n−1 ≥ 1e , pjammeralibi → pl exponentially
as n increases. Thus, it becomes that for any time slot, the
probability of a jammer to get an alibi approximates pl and
the expected number of slots for the jammer to get an alibi is
1/pl (Bernoulli process).
Proof of Theorem 7. With the generalized jammer’s strategy,
for each time slot, the jammer will jam on the main channel
with probability pm, jam on the alibi channel with probability
pa and obey the protocol with probability (1− pm − pa).
Intuitively, for the jammer, the less jamming activities
implies the less damage to the network and the slower time
to get detected. The main reason is the reduction of the
number of slots getting corrupted by the jamming action on
the main channel by the factor of pm (pm = 1 in the previous
considered jammer’s strategy). Apparently, the availability of
the main channel now becomes 1 − pm (instead of 0 in the
previous consider jammer’s strategy).
We now consider the detection time of the Omniscient
protocol under the generalized jammer’s strategy. Similar to
the proof in Theorem 3, we have
Pr[(n-1) nodes get at least one alibi in Eomniscient
′
slots]
≈ e−(n−1)e−
pomniscient
′
alibi E
omniscient′
n−1
where pomniscient
′
alibi = pm×pomniscientalibi and Eomniscient
′
> 0.
Thus, if
Eomniscient
′
=
1
pm
Eomniscient
′
=
1
pm
(
(n−1) ln(n−1)+d(n−1))
for any d > 0, we have
Pr[(n-1) nodes get at least one alibi in Eomniscient
′
slots] ≈ e−e−d
(11)
That means, under the considered generalized jammer’s
strategy, the detection time of the Omniscient protocol is slow
down by the factor of pm.
For the 1-propagation protocol and 1-gossiping protocol, a
similar proof can be done. Therefore, under the generalized
jammer’s strategy, the detection time of the three random
access alibi-based protocol (Omniscient, 1-propagation, 1-
gossiping) is slow down by a factor of pm and the availability
of the main channel becomes 1− pm.
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